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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ALIENS - THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY REVOKE THE VISA OF AN ALIEN
EVEN AFTER AN ALIEN HAS ENTERED THE COUNTRY - Knoetze v. United
States, 634 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1981).
In an action to permanently enjoin the Secretary of State from
revoking his non-immigrant visa, appellant contended that the Secre-
tary had acted without authority and violated his right to due process
of law. Nikolaas Knoetze, a South African world-class boxer had come
to the United States on a non-immigrant visa to take part in a prize
fight. The Secretary of State revoked Knoetze's visa after concluding
that he had been convicted in South Africa of a crime corresponding to
an American felony involving moral turpitude. The Immigration and
Nationality Act renders such foreign convicts ineligible for a visa of
entry into the United States.'
The district court held that the Secretary had acted lawfully and
refused to permanently enjoin the Secretary from revoking Knoetze's
non-immigrant visa.
On appeal, appellant argued that section 1201(i) dealt with the
power to revoke visas prior to entry into the United States. He sup-
ported this argument by stating that (1) the area of the statute in
which section 1201(i) is found outlines only the procedures for visa is-
suance to aliens upon initial entry2 and that (2) the Attorney General,
not the Secretary of State, has primary responsibility over foreigners
already in the country.2 Consequently, he urged that he was entitled to
1. 8 U.s.c. 1182(a)(9) (1976).
2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1230 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. Id. §§ 1231-1260.
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the procedural safeguards" accorded to those aliens subject to the de-
portation authority of the Attorney General.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. On the
issue of the Secretary's authority, Judge Hatchett noted: "Congress has
entrusted deportation to a different department of government, the
Attorney General . . . [but] [w]e accept the argument of the govern-
ment that § 1201(i) means exactly what it says: the Secretary may re-
voke an alien's visa 'at any time' ..... even after he has entered our
country."5
The court next considered whether the revocation of Knoetze's
visa complied with due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Knoetze had argued that by denying him a working visa, the govern-
ment effectively denied him the ability to remain in this country. The
court held that fifth amendment protection attaches only when the
government sues to deny a liberty or property interest and "revocation
of an entry visa issued to an alien already within our country has no
effect upon the alien's liberty or property interests."
ASSIGNMENTS - CouNTERcLAIMs -AcT oV STATE - Empresa Cubana
Exportadora De Azucar Y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1981).
The Republic of Cuba filed a contract action in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York against Lamborn & Company, Inc., a Delaware cor-
poration and the assignee of Craig, a New York partnership with of-
fices in New York and Havana. Cuba alleged that Lamborn, as
assignee, failed to make payment on a contract to purchase sugar from
Banco Cubano del Commercio Exterior, an independent juridical en-
tity wholly owned by the Cuban state. The Republic of Cuba was per-
mitted by the district court to amend its complaint so as to substitute
Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados (Cubazucar)
as plaintiff." In response to this amendment, Lamborn asserted a coun-
terclaim against Cubazucar and a third party claim against the original
4. Id. § 1252(b).
5. Knoetze v. United States, 634 F.2d 207, 210, 212 (2d Cir. 1981) (emphasis
added).
6. Id. at 212.
1. Republic of Cuba v. Lamborn & Co., No. 61 Civ. 1847 - CLB (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
1979).
[Vol. II
